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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
No. 10-2437 
_____________ 
 
REGINALD MATHEIW CASTEL, 
                                            Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                 Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A029 630 580) 
 Immigration Judge Walter A. Durling 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 11, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: May 12, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Reginald Castel petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) which denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  We will 
deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
Castel is a citizen of Haiti.  As a child, he was admitted to the United States in 
1982 and adjusted his status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident in 1989.  In 1999, 
Castel pleaded guilty in New York state court to first degree assault, for which he was 
sentenced to eight years in prison.  In August 2005, the government charged Castel with 
being removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  He sought deferral 
of removal to Haiti under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Castel claimed that 
he would be detained in prison upon removal to Haiti as a criminal deportee, that he 
suffers from acute diabetes requiring twice-daily insulin injections to prevent life-
threatening medical conditions, and, in light of the abysmal prison conditions in Haiti and 
his lack of family ties to assist him with obtaining his medication, he would suffer greatly 
while in prison.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted relief, finding that Castel met his 
burden to establish that he would more likely than not suffer intentional severe pain or 
suffering and would likely die if removed.  The BIA sustained the Government’s appeal, 
vacated the IJ’s order granting deferral of removal, and ordered Castel removed to Haiti.  
The BIA noted that the IJ cited to evidence received in another case and to non-
precedential BIA decisions, and stated that the possibility of suffering under poor prison 
conditions did not substantiate a finding that the Haitian government acquiesces in torture 
of criminal deportees in detention.  The BIA also cited to this Court’s decision in Auguste 
v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005), in concluding generally that Castel did not present 
any evidence that he will more likely than not be subject to torture.  This Court denied 
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Castel’s petition for review.  See Castel v. Att’y Gen., C.A. No. 06-3868 (decision 
entered Oct. 7, 2008).  This Court denied Castel’s motions to remand and for panel 
rehearing, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari 
on October 13, 2009. 
On October 28, 2009, Castel filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, arguing that 
exceptional circumstances warranted reopening.  He included documentation in response 
to his Freedom of Information Act request about Haiti’s detention of criminal deportees, 
a new declaration from the executive of a nonprofit that aids criminal deportees in Haiti, 
updated medical records, and other evidence that had previously been submitted.  He also 
argued that a change in the law warranted reopening, citing this Court’s decision in Pierre 
v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), which this Court had cited in 
denying his earlier petition.  Castel argued that Pierre increased the burden for an alien 
applying for CAT relief, and that because he had not had the opportunity to try to meet 
that new burden, it would violate his due process rights if the BIA did not reopen.  The 
BIA denied the motion, agreeing with the Government that Castel had not submitted any 
new or material evidence that would warrant a remand, and found that Castel could not 
distinguish his case from others where courts found that aliens with medical conditions 
had not shown they were eligible for CAT relief.  The BIA also declined to reopen sua 
sponte on the basis of the change in case law, noting that it did not appear that a remand 
would change the result in Castel’s case.  Castel filed a timely, counseled petition for 
review. 
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II. 
Because Castel was convicted of an aggravated felony, this Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited to review of constitutional claims and questions of law.  Papageorgiou v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  The BIA here 
denied Castel’s motion to reopen because he failed to produce “new or material evidence 
which would warrant a remand of his record.”  A.R. 4.  These determinations are 
questions of fact that we lack jurisdiction to consider.  Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 
F.3d511, 515 (7th Cir. 2008).  Likewise, to the extent the BIA reached the issue of 
whether country conditions had changed in Haiti, such is a factual determination we are 
barred from reviewing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C).  Cf. Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 
483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (BIA’s determination that petitioners had not 
demonstrated extraordinary or changed circumstances to meet exception to asylum 
timeliness requirements was not a question of law within meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D)). 
Although Castel’s motion to reopen was untimely, and although the BIA 
determined that Castel failed to produce new and material evidence to circumvent the 
timeliness requirements, the BIA retained the discretion to reopen Castel’s proceedings 
“sua sponte.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  “[W]e lack jurisdiction to review a decision  on 
whether and how [the BIA] exercise[d] that discretion.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., No. 09-
4454, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 1278741, *2 (3d Cir. April 6, 2011).  However, “we may 
exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied on an 
incorrect legal premise.”  Id. at *3.  Here, the BIA decided not to reopen sua sponte based 
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on two factors:  (1) the “intervening case law” did not “represent an exceptional situation, 
especially since [Castel’s] evidence does not indicate that a remand would change the 
result of his case”; and (2) there was “no evidence that the respondent’s proceedings were 
fundamentally unfair.”  A.R. 5.  Turning to the first factor, one could read Castel’s brief 
as arguing, in essence, that the BIA did not understand that Pierre fundamentally changed 
the law and that, based on that misunderstanding of the law, it therefore failed to 
recognize that exceptional circumstances warranted sua sponte reopening.  We have 
jurisdiction to consider this argument, but, for the following reasons, we disagree with 
Castel’s conclusions. 
In Auguste, this Court denied relief to a Haitian alien who claimed that his 
indefinite detention in a Haitian prison with deplorable conditions would constitute 
torture.  395 F.3d at 153-55.  We held that the alien in that case had not established that 
Haitian authorities had a specific intent to torture detainees.  Id.  We did not adopt “a per 
se rule that brutal and deplorable prison conditions can never constitute torture,” but held 
open the possibility that a claim could succeed if there was evidence that authorities were 
placing an individual in brutal prison conditions with the intent to inflict severe pain and 
suffering on that individual. Id. at 154.  Pierre did not overrule Auguste; in fact, it 
reinforced the proposition that the CAT requires a petitioner to establish specific intent; 
i.e., that his torturer has the motive or purpose of causing him pain or suffering.  Pierre, 
528 F.3d at 189, citing Auguste, 395 F.3d at 145-46.  Thus, Pierre did not “establish” the 
specific intent standard.  Rather, Pierre overruled Lavira v. Attorney General, 478 F.3d 
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158, 171 (3d Cir. 2007), to the extent that it held that specific intent could be based on 
deliberate ignorance or willful blindness, and clarified that “[m]ere knowledge that a 
result is substantially certain to follow from one’s actions is not sufficient to form the 
specific intent to torture.”  Id. 
The hearings in Castel’s immigration proceedings and the BIA’s initial decision in 
his case both occurred after we decided Auguste (decided Jan. 20, 2005) and before 
Lavira, (Feb. 26, 2007).  Thus, Castel was on notice throughout his proceedings that in 
order to succeed he was required to show that Haitian authorities would act with specific 
intent in torturing him.  We disagree with Castel that Pierre fundamentally changed the 
law that was to be applied in his proceedings, and we therefore do not find that the BIA’s 
decision to deny reopening was based on a legal error. 
Castel’s arguments regarding the fairness of his immigration proceedings appear 
to be “naked factual challenges . . . clothed . . . in the garb of due process,” rather than a 
true constitutional argument.  See Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 190.  We lack jurisdiction to 
consider this argument. Castel also argues that his removal will be unfair unless this 
Court takes notice of the conditions in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake.  
However, as Castel acknowledges, this Court’s review is limited to the administrative 
record as it stands.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
